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NOTE
PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS YIELD
TO THE ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS:
PERSPECTIVES ON THE PUBLIC
TRUST DOCTRINE
In response to the environmental crisis of the latter half of the
twentieth century, courts and commentators seeking a theory broadly
applicable to environmental litigation have dusted off the ancient pub-
lic trust doctrine from its origins in Roman law and British common
law.' Traditionally, the doctrine was used to establish public rights to
navigable waters such as oceans and rivers and as a basis for states to
assert their public trust ownership of tidelands.2 As a result of the in-
creasing urgency of the environmental movement and the magnitude of
environmental despoliation in recent years, courts and legislatures
have expanded the scope of the doctrine.
Recent decisions reflect a growing willingness to use the trust doc-
trine as a means of preventing the development and private exploita-
tion of natural resources placed in the legal category of the public
trust. Tensions between private property ownership and public envi-
ronmental and natural resource rights are apparent in modern case law
as private property owners, the public, and the sovereign compete for
scarce resources and litigate over threats to the environment. Public
trust litigation evidences this clash between public and private prop-
erty rights as the courts attempt to carve judicial solutions to environ-
mental problems..
1. F. GRAD, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 1005 (3d ed. 1985); see Sax, The Public Trust Doc-
trine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471
(1970).
2. F. GRAD, supra note 1, at 1006.
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I. OVERVIEW OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
A. Genesis in Roman Law
The public trust concept includes state ownership of property held
exclusively for the benefit of and use by the general public. In its old-
est form, the doctrine generally prohibits the state from alienating
these lands into private hands. This concept has its roots in ancient
Roman laws governing seas, seashores, and rivers. In Roman law, a
classification scheme developed which grouped types of public and pri-
vate properties.3
Res extra commercium included three types of property that were
prevented from being the object of private rights." These three classes
of property were res divini juris,5 res publicae,6 and res ominium com-
munes.7 Res ominium communes included property similar to that
within the scope of the modern public trust: the air, the waters of nat-
ural streams, the sea, and the bed of the sea.' The concept of a public
trust was reflected in the scholarly thought of the day. Cicero, for ex-
ample, believed that the seashore was not owned by any individual and
could be used by everyone."
In Justinian's law, a similar classification scheme prevailed. The
term res publicae denoted property that was held for common use and,
in principle, could never be the object of exclusive individual rights.10
According to Justinian, this category of property was classified as res
extra commercium and was not within the domain of private law.'1
In his Institutes, Justinian expounds the law of the use of prop-
erty belonging to the public. 12 These laws are remarkably similar to the
modern conception of the public trust in American law as it pertains to
oceans and rivers. 13 He believed that the "air, running water, the sea,
3. See R. SOHM, THE INSTITUTES: A TEXTBOOK OF THE HISTORY AND SYSTEM OF RO-
MAN PRIVATE LAW 302-09 (J. Ledlie trans. 3d ed. 1970).
4. Id. at 302.
5. Res divini juris were divided into three subcategories including (1) res sacrae
dedicated to the gods; (2) res sanctae, which enjoyed the protection of the gods; and (3)
res religiosae dedicated to burial grounds. Id. at 302-03.
6. The term res publicae denoted public property. It embraced everything owned
by the Roman people and "outside of the pale of private law." Id. at 303.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. A. WATSON, THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN THE LATER ROMAN REPUBLIC 13 (1984).
10. See R. SOHM, supra note 3, at 303.
11. Id.
12. T. COOPER, THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN 67-70 (1812).
13. See, e.g., Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894).
(Vol. 41
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and consequently the shores of the sea"' 4 were "[t]hings common to
mankind by the law of nature."''1 Rivers and ports belonged to the
public; the public enjoyed the concomitant rights of fishing and naviga-
tion.'6 The use of riverbanks was "[b]y the law of nations... as public
as the rivers."'17 Public rights to the riverbanks included the liberty to
"land. . . vessels, unload them, and to fasten ropes to trees upon the
banks, as to navigate upon the river itself .... "I'
Initially a lack of clarity existed as to whether these public waters
were owned by no one, by the people, or by the State; the latter
emerged as the winner:
[I]n general, the shore was not owned by individuals. One text sug-
gests that it was the property of the Roman People. More often it is
regarded as owned by no one, the public having undefined rights of
use and enjoyment .... Whether the river-bed belonged to the Ro-
man People, or to the riparian owners, or to no one was never clearly
defined. There was, no doubt, a tendency, which became more pro-
nounced as time went on, to regard all res publicae as the property of
the Roman People, or, as we should say, of the State .... 19
One distinction between the ancient Roman trust doctrine and the
modern American public trust is that Roman law did not provide a
legal remedy for the assertion of public rights against the state for its
failure to protect the public interest. 0
B. Development in British Law
Under the British crown, title to public lands was held in trust by
the King for the benefit of the nation. Titles to lands under English
waters, such as navigable waters and tidelands, were vested in the
King.2' The King could grant the land to private owners, but the
grants were subject to the public's paramount right to the use of the
waters-a right the King could neither abridge nor destroy.22 If the
grant interfered with the implied reservation of the public right or
harmed the public interest, the grant was rendered void.2a Parliament,
14. T. COOPER, supra note 12, at 67.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 68.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. R. LEE, THE ELEMENTS OP ROMAN LAW 106-07 (1944) (footnotes omitted).
20. See Sax, supra note 1, at 475.
21. See People v. New York & Staten Island Ferry Co., 68 N.Y. 71, 76 (1877).
22. Id.
23. Id. "The jus privatum that is acquired by the subject, either by patent or by
prescription, must not prejudice the jus publicum, wherewith public rivers and arms of
1990]
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however, could exercise its police power to enlarge or restrict public
rights in order to advance a "legitimate public purpose."2 4
At earliest British common law, courts recognized sound public
policy principles that formed the foundations of the public trust doc-
trine. The common right to use of the sea and navigable rivers was
viewed as essential to commerce, trade, and navigation. The private
appropriation of this use potentially could cripple or destroy commerce
and navigation. 25 Fishing rights also were protected for the benefit of
the public as a whole.26 State regulation of the public use of navigable
waters was permitted only in the public interest and as was "'deemed
consistent with the preservation of a public right.' ,,17
C. The Public Trust in American Law: the Watershed Case
Roman and British history is reflected in American common law
which fosters the special protection of public uses of certain lands and
waters.28 While the doctrine was cited in early American cases, its
sharp teeth were felt acutely and were of dispositive impact in Illinois
Central Railroad v. Illinois.29 In Illinois Central, the railroad company
asserted its title to submerged beds of Lake Michigan by virtue of an
1869 fee simple grant from the Illinois legislature. The grant included a
one mile stretch of shoreline along the city of Chicago. The area of the
grant extended one mile from the shore into the lake and encompassed
a total area of over one thousand acres." In 1883, the Attorney General
brought suit asserting the state of Michigan's title to the bed of the
lake and certain areas of the shore which were lined with the railroad's
tracks, piers, and warehouses.3 1
The Court analyzed the development and implications of the pub-
lic trust doctrine, then applied it to invalidate the legislature's grant.
The Court stated that the navigable waters of the harbor and the lands
the sea are affected by the public use." Id.
24, See Sax, supra note 1, at 476; see also Martin v. Waddell's Leasee, 41 U.S. (16
Pet.) 367, 412-13 (1842) (Court expressed opinion that the Magna Charta divested King
of power to grant to subjects the soil under navigable waters).
25. New York & Staten Island Ferry Co., 68 N.Y. at 77.
26. Sax, supra note 1, at 475. But see Fraser, Title to the Soil Under Public Wa-
ters-A Question of Fact, 2 MINN. L. Rnv. 313, 336-37 (1918) (arguing that the King, who
could benefit navigation and commerce without owning the soil beneath the waters, in-
tended to benefit only himself by gaining revenues from their use).
27. Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 458 (1892) (quoting New York &
Staten Island Ferry Co., 68 N.Y. at 77).
28. See Sax, supra note 1, at 476.
29. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
30. Id. at 454.
31. Id. at 433,
[Vol. 41
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under them were held in trust for the public.3 2 The state's control for
purposes of this trust could never be alienated or lost, except in the
case of parcels of trust land used in promoting the public interest or
disposed of without impairing the public's interest in the remaining
lands and waters. The Court was especially impressed with the vast
area of the grant and its vital commercial importance to the city of
Chicago. The Court stated that the area was as "large as that embraced
by all the merchandise docks along the Thames at London;. . . twice
that of the port of Marsailles, and nearly, if not quite, equal to the pier
area along the water front of the city of New York."'33
The Court held that the legislative act of April 1869 was inopera-
tive to affect the sovereignty, dominion, and ownership of the state
over the lands.34 Since the legislature, as grantor, conveyed the prop-
erty in disregard of the public trust by which it was bound to hold and
manage it, the contract was repealable and the grant was void. Just as
divesting the state of control of the harbor and transferring control to
a foreign nation or a corporation of another state would be "a gross
perversion of the trust over the property under which it is held,"35 the
Court found it inconceivable that the state would vest title to the har-
bor in a private corporation.36
Principles articulated by the Illinois Central Court have become
essential to modern public trust litigation. Professor Sax, the pre-emi-
nent authority on the public trust doctrine, summarizes the decision's
impact in terms of state management of public resources such as rivers,
seashores, and national parks. A state's holding of resources available
for the general public will cause a court to "look with considerable
skepticism upon any governmental conduct which is calculated either
to reallocate that resource to more restrictive uses or to subject public
use to the self-interest of private parties. 37 The implications of the
decision provided a springboard for the emergence of the doctrine as a
viable cause of action in contemporary environmental law.
D. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi: Invigorating the
Sovereign's Public Trust Interest in Nonnavigable Tidelands
In an arguably "radical expansion of the historical limits of the
public trust,"38 the Supreme Court held in Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
32. Id. at 459.
33. Id. at 454.
34. Id. at 460.
35. Id. at 455.
36. Id. at 454-55.
37. Sax, supra note 1, at 490 (emphasis in original).
38. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 493 (1988) (O'Connor J.,
1990]
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Mississippi39 that the public trust in the state of Mississippi includes
title to all lands under waters influenced by the ebb and flow of the
tide. 0 The dispute arose when the state granted oil and gas leases to
land underlying the Bayou LaCroix and eleven small drainage streams
in southwestern Mississippi. Record title to this land was held by Phil-
lips Petroleum. The titles were traceable to prestatehood Spanish land
grants. Phillips and its predecessors-in-interest paid taxes on the land
for over one hundred years. Despite Phillips' record title, Mississippi
based its assertion of title on its claim that it owned all tidelands in
the state and held them in public trust.41
The Supreme Court clarified and expanded the public trust inter-
est in tidelands. First, the court rejected Phillips' contention42 that
"navigability-and not tidal influence-has become the sine qua non
of the public trust interest in tidelands in this country.' 3 The Court
viewed its earlier decisions as recognizing the doctrine's scope to in-
clude all lands beneath waters influenced by the ebb and flow of the
tide, regardless of the navigability of the waters." The court held that
upon entry into the Union, the states, by virtue of the equal footing
doctrine,45 were given ownership of all lands under tidal waters.4 Since
the lands at issue were tidally influenced, the title to them passed to
the state of Mississippi upon its entry into the Union. 7
The majority rejected the petitioners' argument that the decision
would upset their reasonable, settled property expectations based on
their holding record title to the disputed lands and on the fact that
they paid taxes on the land for more than a century.'8 The court rea-
soned that settled case law in Mississippi made clear the state's general
public trust interest in tidelands, even though the issue of its claim to
nonnavigable tidelands was of first impression.4'9 The majority cited
the "long established" 5 rule that "[s]tates have the authority to define
dissenting).
39. 484 U.S. 469 (1988).
40. Id. at 484.
41. Id. at 472.
42. Id. at 478-80.
43. Id. at 478.
44. Id. at 479-80.
45. Upon entry into the Union, the original thirteen states were given all lands
under tidal waters. The equal footing doctrine provides that the rest of the states simi-
larly succeeded to the King's rights with respect to waters within their borders. See id. at
486 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 481-84.
47. Id. at 476.
48. Id. at 481-84.
49. Id. at 482.
50. Id. at 475.
[Vol. 41
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the limits of the lands held in public trust and to recognize private
rights in such lands as they see fit."5' The Court reasoned that the
decision will not upset titles in coastal states which have, as a matter
of state law, granted public trust tidelands to private property own-
ers.2 Further, many land title disputes have been resolved by the ebb-
and-flow rule for tidelands-a holding that navigability was the deter-
minative factor in state public trust interest would upset far more ti-
tles and settled expectations of property owners."" Finally, public fish-
ing, hunting, and bathing rights retained in states where tidelands
have been granted to private owners would be jeopardized if public
trust rights in nonnavigable tidal waters were lost.
5 4
Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Stevens and Justice Scalia,
strongly dissented. Alarmed that the majority's decision "will disrupt
the settled expectations of landowners not only in Mississippi but in
every coastal State, '55 the Justices dissented from "this undoing of set-
tled history."5 6 According to the dissent, the danger in the majority
rule was the degree to which it expanded traditional public trust rights
in tidelands. Before the decision, this public interest extended primar-
ily to waters that were a part of or immediately bordered navigable
waters, including navigable waterway borders, bays, and inlets.
The legal effect of the decision is to extend the state's public trust
interest to tidal, nonnavigable waters which include discrete bodies of
water remote from and indirectly interconnected to the ocean or navi-
gable tidal waters.5 7 The dissenting Justices argued that the effect of
including such waters, for example, the Louisiana streams and bayous
at issue in the case, could be prevented by making navigability, not
tidal influence, the standard of public trust interest.5 8
The dissent further argued that the majority's holding had dra-
matic, far-reaching, and undesirable pragmatic impacts. The court
noted that the traditional public trust uses include the facilitation of
commerce and the promotion of the public's interest in fishing.59 In
contrast, the state of Mississippi advocated this expansion of the pub-
lic trust in order to issue exploitative oil, gas, and mineral leases to
private parties.60 Furthermore, thousands of innocent record title and
51. Id.
52. Id. at 482.
53. Id. at 483.
54. Id. at 483-84.
55. Id. at 485.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 490.
58. Id.
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leaseholders of land could be displaced by the Court's decision. 1 Ac-
cording to the dissent, nine million acres of land have been classified as
fresh or saline wetlands; the majority's rule will increase challenges to
these titles.62 Commentators have noted that, in effect, the decision
will "fortify the operation of the trust as a state tool for economic and
environmental control of significant resources [and give strength to]
legislatures and activists who choose to assert the public interest more
forcefully in an age of ever-increasing property conflicts.
'63
E. The Public Trust Doctrine in South Carolina Law
In Phillips Petroleum the United States Supreme Court cited
State v. Pinckney64 as case authority for the proposition that a state
can have dominion over salt marshes beneath nonnavigable tidal wa-
ters. Pinckney is the seminal South Carolina public trust doctrine case.
In Pinckney the court applied the doctrine to establish public owner-
ship of marshes.6 5 The dispute in Pinckney arose when the state, as-
serting its ownership of the marshes, filed suit against the defendants
for digging, mining, and removing phosphate ore from salt marshlands
surrounding Morgan Island.66 The court found the common law rule to
be that the boundary of land bordered by a tidal navigable stream ex-
tended only to the high water mark.67 If the land is bounded by the sea
or an arm of the sea, the space between the high and low water mark is
the shore, and belongs by common law to the sovereign. The sovereign
holds this land in trust for the public, thus precluding the claim of any
person who has not acquired title by grant from the sovereign. 8
While discussing the public trust in terms of land bordered by the
sea and tidal navigable streams, the court nevertheless went on to ap-
ply the doctrine to vast areas of salt marsh located far inland. Conclud-
ing that title to the marshland between low water and ordinary high
water had never been conveyed by the state, the court held that the
state was entitled to recover its ownership of the disputed salt mar-
shes. 0 The Phillips Petroleum Court used Pinckney as authority sup-
61. Id. at 493.
62. Id. at 494.
63. See Note, Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi and the Public Trust Doctrine;
Strengthening Sovereign Interest in Tidal Property, 38 CATH. U.L. REX. 571, 597-98
(1989).
64. 22 S.C. 484, 507-09 (1885).
65. Id. at 509.
66. Id. at 495.
67. Id, at 507.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 510.
[Vol. 41
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porting Mississippi's claim of ownership of all the tidelands in the
state.70 The Court also used Pinckney and similar cases to extend the
public trust to include land beneath nonnavigable tidal waters.7
1
As in Pinckney, later cases involving disputed titles to marshlands
have recognized that these lands are held by the state in trust for the
public. For example, in State v. Fain72 the state asserted its title to
tidelands adjacent to a tidal navigable stream. The state prevailed
against the claim of private ownership since the grants lacked language
evidencing an intent to convey the tidelands below the high water
mark. The South Carolina Supreme Court held that title to the portion
between the high and low water mark remained in the state for the
public's benefit.7
3
Similarly, in Hobonny Club, Inc. v. McEachern,"4 the court noted
that tidelands "enjoy a special or unique status, being held by the
State in trust for public purposes. 1 7 5 The Hobonny court aligned this
rule with the historic common law of England which permitted the
King to grant tidelands to subjects who could exercise private owner-
ship of the tidelands."6 The court held that since the eighteenth cen-
tury grants in dispute had specific plat references evidencing an intent
to convey land below the high water mark, the grants were sufficient to
convey title to the public trust tidelands to a private corporation.
7
The South Carolina Supreme Court significantly expanded the
public trust interest in tidelands in State v. South Carolina Coastal
Council.18 This case represents the modern trend, since unlike the ma-
jority of earlier South Carolina public trust cases, Coastal did not in-
volve a title dispute. Instead, the dispute arose over a permit issued by
the South Carolina Coastal Council involving 660 acres of marshland at
Annandale Plantation in the Santee River Delta area of Georgetown
County. 9
The terms of the permit authorized the respondent, a private citi-
zen, to construct embankments which would enclose 660 acres and re-
70. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 474-75 n.3 (1988).
71. Id.; see also Wright v. Seymour, 69 Cal. 122, 123-27, 10 P. 323, 324-26 (1886)
(California owned bottom of Russian River which was tidal but not navigable in fact);
Simons v. French, 25 Conn. 346, 352-53 (1856) (tidal flats adjoining arm of sea are within
public ownership).
72. 273 S.C. 748, 259 S.E.2d 606 (1979).
73. Id. at 752, 259 S.E.2d at 608.
74. 272 S.C. 392, 252 S.E.2d 133 (1979).
75. Id. at 396, 252 S.E.2d at 135.
76. Id.; 252 S.E.2d at 136 (citing Lane v. McEachern, 251 S.C. 272, 162 S.E.2d 174
(1968)).
77. Id.
78. 289 S.C. 445, 346 S.E.2d 716 (1986).
79. Id. at 446, 346 S.E.2d at 717.
1990]
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sult in the loss of 50 acres of marsh as well as the removal of the 660
acres from the unimpounded Santee Estuarine System. The permit
was granted subject to two conditions: (1) that state and federal agen-
cies be allowed to conduct mariculture experiments within the confines
of the created impoundment; arid (2) that the status of the title to the
land remain unaffected.80 The appellants contended that the permit
"unlawfully allow[ed] the blockage of navigable streams"81 and was in
violation of Coastal Council regulations because it exceeded the Coun-





Acting under the broad umbrella of the public trust, the court fol-
lowed several lines of attack and ultimately invalidated the permit. Al-
though vast acres of marshland were threatened, the court focused on
the navigable canals and ditches within the marshland and subjected
the permit to constitutional scrutiny because of the blockage of these
canals. Article XIV, section 4 of the South Carolina Constitution pro-
vides that "[a]ll navigable waters shall forever remain public highways
free to the citizens of the State . . [and no] wharf [shall be] erected
on the shores or in or over the waters of any navigable stream unless
the same be authorized by the General Assembly. 8 3 The court deter-
mined that the true test of navigability is "whether a stream inherently
and by its nature has the capacity for valuable floatage, irrespective of
the fact of actual use or the extent of such use."8' The court concluded
that since these waterways were regularly used by the general public
for boating, they were navigable in fact.
Following traditional public trust principles, the court recognized
that "boating, hunting, and fishing [are] legitimate and beneficial pub-
lic use[s]. ' '8 5 Noting that the passageways were used by pleasure boat-
80. Id. at 447, 346 S.E.2d at 717.
81. Id. at 446, 346 S.E.2d at 717.
82. Id.
83. S.C. CONsT. art. XIV, § 4.
84. South Carolina Coastal Council, 289 S.C. at 449, 346 S.E.2d at 719 (citing Hey-
ward v. Farmers Mining Co., 42 S.C. 138, 19 S.E. 963 (1894)); see also State v. Pacific
Guano Co., 22 S.C. 50 (1884) (court repudiated common law doctrine that navigability of
a stream is to be determined by the ebb and flow of the tide); Lazarus, Changing Con-
ceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural Resources: Questioning the Public
Trust Doctrine, 71 IowA L. REV. 631, 647-48 & n.90 ("Gradually, application of the pub-
lic trust doctrine has shifted to include navigable waters that do not meet the federal
test of navigability for the purposes of state sovereign title, but instead satisfy the lesser
state law standard .... "); Rosen, Public and Private Ownership Rights in Lands
Under Navigable Waters: The Governmental/Proprietary Distinction, 34 U. FLA. L. REv.
561, 612 (1982) (proposing that a better solution is to apply property law to title disputes
and police power principles to regulatory controversies).
85. South Carolina Coastal Council, 289 S.C. at 450, 346 S.E.2d at 719.
[Vol. 41
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ers to gain access to the interior of the island, the court stressed the
strong protection traditionally afforded to this public trust interest:
"there cannot be the least doubt that the public is as much entitled to
be protected in its use of [navigable waters] for floating pleasure boats
as for any other purpose." 86 For these reasons, the court found the per-
mit could not withstand constitutional attack:
The use of this waterway by the general public for boating, hunting,
and fishing is a legitimate an beneficial public 'use. It is our view that
these waterways not only have the [required] navigable capacity .. ,
but they are navigable in fact as evidenced by their use by the general
public.
8 7
The Council, the court held, did not have the authority to issue a per-
mit allowing complete blockage of navigable waterways, especially
where no overriding public interest existed.8
The environmental impact of the proposed developments of the
marshes concerned the court. The 660 acres of marshland were trav-
ersed by approximately nine canals and ditches which were vestiges of
those dug by early rice planters. The court noted the ecological value
of these ditches and canals which "facilitate[d] the movement of water
and various organisms and organic material between the major natural
creeks with which they connect[ed] and the marsh itself."8 9
One ostensible purpose of the impoundment was the development
of aquaculture. The evidence, however, showed that the impoundment
would "only be minimally effective for aquaculture purposes and the
benefit to the public tenuous."90 The primary purpose of the impound-
ment was a commercial waterfowl venture in which the permittee
planned to build ten duck blinds and lease them for $1000.00 per blind
per year.91 These purposes were insufficient to show an overriding pub-
lic interest justifying destruction of the marshes.
In South Carolina, the public trust doctrine traditionally has been
used as a means for the state to reclaim its ownership of tidelands
when the owner cannot trace the title to a grant from the state or pro-
duce evidence of the grantor's intent to convey to the low water
86. Id. (quoting State ex rel. Lyon v. Columbia Water Power Co., 82 S.C. 181, 189,
63 S.E. 884, 888 (1909)).
87. Id. (citing Heyward v. Farmers Mining Co., 42 S.C. 138, 19 S.E. 963 (1894)).
88. Id. (the court also analyzed the purposes and effects of the permit in light of
Council Regulations). But see State v. Columbia Water Power Co., 90 S.C. 568, 573-74,
74 S.E. 26, 27-28 (1912) and cases cited therein.
89. South Carolina Coastal Council, 289 S.C. at 448, 346 S.E.2d at 718.
90. Id. at 450, 346 S.E.2d at 719.
91. Id. at 450-51, 346 S.E.2d at 719-20.
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mark.9 2 South Carolina courts also recognize a strong public trust in-
terest in navigable waterways.9 3 The Coastal decision expands the doc-
trine beyond its traditional purview because the court used tenets of
the public trust doctrine to prevent the commercial exploitation of
public lands by a private party. Interestingly, the court applied public
trust principles to prevent the private development of the marshland
by using the presence of navigable canals and ditches as a dispositive
factor. In doing so, the Coastal court arguably accomplished the same
result as the Phillips Petroleum Court; however, in Phillips Petroleum
the Court explicitly held that the public trust extends to nonnavigable,
tidally-influenced lands.
9 4
In Rice Hope Plantation v. South Carolina Public Service Au-
thority"' the court cited the public trust doctrine as a means for state
regulation of privately owned lands and waters. The plaintiff corpora-
tion in Rice Hope alleged that the construction of a dam on a river
caused salt water to infiltrate streams and tidelands that ran through
its property. While declining to rule on methods that could be used by
private owners to acquire title to lands below the high water mark on
tidal navigable streams, the court opined that "any such ownership
would be. . . subject to the dominant power of the government (State
and Federal) to control and regulate navigable waters."9 The court
quoted with approval language from United States v. Commodore
Park,7 in which the Supreme Court stated that private title holders of
public trust land under navigable waters were subject to the govern-
ment's paramount regulatory authority:
"United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. Co., set at rest any
remaining doubt concerning the dominant power of the government to
control and regulate navigable waterways in the interest of commerce,
without payment of compensation to one who under state law may
hold 'technical' legal title (as between himself and others in the gov-
ernment) to a part of a navigable stream's bed."98
Thus, South Carolina courts have recognized a strong public trust in-
92. See, e.g., State v. South Carolina Phosphate Co., 22 S.C. 593 (1884).
93. See, e.g., Cape Romain Land & Improvement Co. v. Georgia-Carolina Canning
Co., 148 S.C. 428, 146 S.E. 434 (1928).
94. See supra text accompanying notes 38-63.
95. 216 S.C. 500, 59 S.E.2d 132 (1950), overruled on other grounds, McCall v. Bat-
son, 285 S.C. 243, 329 S.E.2d 741 (1985) (abolishing doctrine of sovereign immunity).
96. Id. at 530, 59 S.E.2d at 145.
97. 324 U.S. 386 (1945).
98. Rice Hope, 216 S.C. at 528-29, 59 S.E.2d at 144 (quoting Commodore Park, 324
U.S. at 390) (citation omitted)); see Early v. South Carolina Pub. Serv. Auth., 228 S.C.
392, 90 S.E.2d 472 (1955); Brief of Appellant at 9, State v. South Carolina Coastal Coun-
cil, 289 S.C. 445, 346 S.E.2d 716 (1986) (No. 84-51).
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terest in navigable waters and tidelands.
F. Expansion: The Doctrine's Use in Other Jurisdictions
The scope of the public trust doctrine has been expanded to ac-
commodate a broad range of environmental concerns. As a result of
Phillips Petroleum, the public trust interest in tidelands may he ex-
tended to nonnavigable tidal marshes and streams. The Phillips Petro-
leum opinion indicates that the doctrine also can be applied to "navi-
gable fresh-waters and the lands beneath them."99 Extending the
applicability of the doctrine beyond water resources, courts have in-
cluded wildlife, 00 archaeological relics, 10' endangered species of plants
and animals,0 2 parklands,'103 natural forests, 0 4 filled marshlands,'
05
and an historic battlefield site'016 within the doctrine's scope. At least
one court, however, has refused to apply the doctrine to air.'07 The
doctrine is codified by legislation 08 or constitutional amendment'0 9 in
99. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 479 (1988).
100. See Wade v. Kramer, 121 Ill. App. 3d 377, 459 N.E.2d 1025 (1984) (state is
trustee of wildlife and archaeological relics which it holds in public trust).
101. See id.
102. See id. at 377, 459 N.E.2d at 1025 (doctrine not violated by damage to wildlife
and archaeological remains caused by building highway through county conservation
area).
103. Paepcke v. Public Bldg. Comm'n, 46 Ill. 2d 330, 263 N.E.2d 11 (1970) (suit to
enjoin implementation of plans to construct school and recreational facilities in two
parks).
104. Gould v. Greylock Reservation Comm'n, 350 Mass. 410, 215 N.E.2d 114 (1966).
105. State v. Murrell's Inlet Camp & Marina, Inc., 259 S.C. 404, 192 S.E.2d 199
(1972) (state claimed title to natural salt marshes allegedly filled by the defendant). But
see City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. 3d 515, 606 P.2d 362 (1980) (filled parcels
of land are rendered valueless for public trust purposes), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 840
(1980).
106. Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., 454 Pa. 193, 311
A.2d 588 (1973).
107. See Evans v. City of Johnstown, 96 Misc. 2d 755, 410 N.Y.S.2d 199 (Sup. Ct.
1978) (plaintiffs alleged maintenance of sewage facilities polluted air over city).
108. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22a-14 to -20 (West 1985 & Supp. 1989); MICH. CoMP.
LAws ANN. § 691.1201-.1207 (West 1987); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 116 B.01-B.13 (West 1987
& Supp. 1990).
109. See, e.g., LA. CONST. art. IX, § 1; PA. CONST. art. I, § 27. Pennsylvania amended
its state constitution to include the public trust doctrine:
The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the preservation of the
natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment. Pennsylvania's
public natural resources are the common property of all the people, including
generations yet to come. As trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth
shall conserve and maintain them for the benefit of all the people.
Id.; see also National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., 454 Pa. at 209, 311 A.2d at 596
(Jones, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that the amendment "installs the common law public
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several states.
The public trust doctrine has become increasingly malleable as a
remedy for environmental harms. It has been used as a vehicle to gain
standing n1 and shift burdens of proof." Although the doctrine tradi-
tionally has been asserted by states, some courts have recognized a
general trust duty applicable to the federal government. 1 2 In Sierra
Club v. Department of the Interior,'" the court concluded that a duty
was imposed on the National Park Service "to conserve scenery and
natural and historic objects and wildlife ...and to provide for the
enjoyment of the same in such manner ... as will leave them
unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations."1 Similarly,
other courts have recognized that the sovereign right to protect the
public interest in preserving wildlife resources allows the United States
to maintain an action for damages to its public lands and the natural
resources on them.1
II. IMPLICATIONS FOR PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS
The re-emergence of the public trust doctrine is a symptom of a
fundamental and profound change occurring in the American concept
of property ownership: the decline of the distinction between public
and private property. Professor Duncan Kennedy argues that the lines
of demarcation between public and private societal institutions are
blurring and that eventually the distinction will disappear.1 6 Accord-
ing to Professor Kennedy, the stages of the decline are already evident.
He notes that "the development of intermediate terms means formal
trust doctrine as a constitutional right to environmental protection susceptible to en-
forcement by an action in equity").
110. See, e.g., Timm v. Portage County Drainage Dist., 145 Wis. 2d 743, 751 n.8, 429
N.W.2d 512, 516 n.8 (Ct. App. 1988) (party suing for purposes of vindicating public trust
in navigable waters has standing to assert causes of action recognized by state law).
111. See Texas E. Transmission Corp. v. Wildlife Preserves, 48 N.J. 261, 225 A.2d
130 (1966).
112. See, e.g., United States v. 1.58 Acres of Land, 523 F. Supp. 120, 125 (D. Mass.
1981).
113. 398 F. Supp. 284 (N.D. Cal. 1975), modified, 424 F. Supp. 172 (1976).
114. Id. at 287 (citations omitted).
115. See United States v. Burlington N. R.R., 710 F. Supp. 1286, 1287 (D. Neb.
1989) (court refused summary judgment in action for damages to wildlife destroyed by
fire on government land); accord In re Matter of Stewart Transp. Co., 495 F. Supp. 38,
40 (E.D. Va. 1980); see also Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652, 671 (1st
Cir. 1980) (since statutory recovery was possible, court declined to decide whether public
trust doctrine permits trustee to sue for damages to public natural resources including
trees and animals), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981).
116. See Kennedy, The Stages of Decline of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U.
PA. L. REV. 1349 (1982).
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recognition that some situations are . . . neither public nor pri-
vate-but rather share some characteristics of each pole" and are
treated as public for some purposes and private for others.
117
As examples supporting his theory, Kennedy cites the grain eleva-
tors in Munn v. Illinois"" and the restrictive covenants in Shelley v.
Kraemer." 9 In Shelley, the public/private distinction collapsed when
"the fourteenth amendment required the states to outlaw any 'private'
actor who practiced racial discrimination."'120 Kennedy coined the de-
scriptive terms "continuumization"'' 1 (meaning that people see most
entities not as absolutely one thing or another) and "loopification"'
2
(a concept signifying that today it may be impossible to distinguish
public from private since it is becoming one loop). He concludes that
"one simply loses one's ability to take the public/private distinction
seriously as a description, as an explanation, or as a justification of
anything.'
23
At the boundaries of the public trust doctrine is the evidence of a
form of quasi-public, quasi-private property which is the radical new
species envisioned by Professor Kennedy. An example of the public
trust brought to bear on private property occurs in Texas Eastern
Transmission Corp. v. Wildlife Preserves."4 Wildlife Preserves was a
private, nonprofit corporation that acquired lands and devoted them to
wildlife conservation and preservation. Texas Eastern sought to con-
demn a right-of-way across 1400 acres of Preserves' land in order to
install underground gas transmission pipelines. In its answer, Preserves
alleged "that the lands were devoted to a prior public use, i.e. conser-
vation and the preservation of wildlife, and in the circumstances not
subject to condemnation for plaintiff's purpose.""125 The private prop-
erty became so mixed with the public's use that distinctions became
difficult to draw.
The court noted that not only the property, but also its owner, was
a sort of public/private hybrid that merged as a response to the envi-
ronmental concerns that are becoming commonplace today, yet were
unheard until the latter half of this century:
Defendant is not a public agency or a public utility; it is a private
enterprise carried on by a public-spirited nonprofit organization for
117. Id. at 1351.
118. 94 U.S. 113, 126-34 (1876).
119. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
120. Kennedy, supra note 116, at 1352.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1354.
123. Id. at 1357.
124. 48 N.J. 261, 225 A.2d 130 (1966).
125. Id. at 265, 225 A.2d at 133.
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the purpose of preserving our natural wildlife resources.
• ..Defendant's voluntary consecration of its lands as a wildlife
preserve, while not giving it the cloak of a public utility, does invest it
with a special and unique status. Qualitatively. . .the status might
be described as lower than that of a public utility but higher than that
of an ordinary owner who puts his land to conventional use.
126
The unique environmental value of the Preserves' land prompted
the court to distinguish the situation from that of an ordinary property
owner and to provide ultimately for a more favorable burden of proof
for the defendant.127 The court reasoned that the "devotion of [Wild-
life Preserves'] land to a purpose which is encouraged and often en-
gaged in by government itself gives it a somewhat more potent claim to
judicial protection against taking . .. by arbitrary action of a con-
demnor." 28 This burden of proof reverses the traditional rule that the
private owner of condemned property bears the burden of showing the
government acted unfairly. The shifting of the burden of proof seems
to reflect the court's tacit recognition of the environmental value of the
wetlands.1 2 Thus, this private property was subsumed under of the
umbrella of the public interest.
Another example of a merger of public and private rights occurred
with the enactment of the South Carolina Coastal Tidelands Statute.13 0
This statute places a moratorium on development of ocean front prop-
erty accreted by natural forces. The newly accreted land is held in pub-
lic trust for the people of South Carolina.13 1 The statute reverses the
common law rule which provided that private owners of oceanfront
land may own land up to the high water mark.132 As a classic example
of the public trust doctrine enacted into law, the statute in effect
places private lands into the public trust.
The decline of the distinction between public and private property
is increasingly evident in environmental law. The expansion of the
public interest in natural resources and the environment is apparent in
comprehensive environmental legislation, the public trust doctrine, and
wetlands and coastal protection. Related fields of law such as historic
126. Id. at 267-68, 225 A.2d at 134.
127. Id. at 268, 225 A.2d at 134.
128. Id. at 273, 225 A.2d at 137.
129. See Coquillette, Mosses from an Old Manse: Another Look at Some Historic
Property Cases About the Environment, 64 CoRNSLL L. REv. 761, 817 (1979) (concluding
that the decision "forecasts a shift in the burden of proof in favor of environmental
plaintiffs.").
130. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-120 (Law. Co-op. 1987).
131. Id. § 48-39-120(B).
132. See, e.g., State v. Pinckney, 22 S.C. 484 (1885).
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preservation, open space zoning, and growth control 8 3 also illustrate
expanding governmental control and regulation that extend into the
bounds of private property.
1 3 4
Historically, private property owners were buttressed by nine-
teenth century laissez faire ideals of ownership and enjoyed unfettered
freedom within the domain of their parcels of property. Traditionally
sacrosanct property rights, including the right to exclude, were aptly
described as the right of the property's "commander 'to look any man
in the eye and tell him to go to hell.' "135 Private ownership also in-
cluded the right to manage the property and direct the manner in
which resources were to be used and exploited."3 6
The development of the law of nuisance marked the beginning of
curbs on the rights of owners: the property owner was free to do
whatever he wished, so long as neighboring owners were not disturbed.
In recent years, legislation enacted in response to the environmental
crisis proscribes and abdicates more of these freedoms by prohibiting
conduct by which land and natural resources are polluted or contami-
nated. The concomitant development of common law theories such as
nuisance and the public trust doctrine evidence the growing tendency
toward judicial intervention in order to remedy and prevent adverse
environmental impacts.137 The result is a "major transformation in
which property rights are being fundamentally redefined to the disad-
133. See Sax, Some Thoughts on the Decline of Private Property, 58 WASH. L. REv.
481, 482 (1983).
134. Several recent decisions, however, reflect an effort by some courts to limit pub-
lic rights to private property by applying constitutional principles of takings law. See,
e.g., Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168 (Me. 1989) (Public Trust in Intertidal Land Act
which gave public right to use privately owned intertidal land for recreation without
compensating owners was unconstitutional taking); Concerned Citizens of Brunswick
County Taxpayers Ass'n v. Holden Beach Enters., 95 N.C. App. 38, 381 S.E.2d 810
(1989) (application of public trust doctrine to give public right of access to beach at
expense of private property owners would deprive owners of property rights without just
compensation); cf. First Presbyterian Church v. City Council, 25 Pa. Commw. 154, -,
360 A.2d 257, 263 (1976) (Kramer, J., concurring) ("[L]egislatures and courts are adding
a new dimension which may do violence to constitutional private property rights, for now
we hold that a private property owner must make his property available without com-
pensation for public view.").
135. M. BALL, LYING DOWN ToGETHER LAW, METApHOR. AND THEOLOGY 108 (1985)
(quoting W. LIPPMANN, THE METHOD OF FREEDOM 101-02 (1934)).
136. These and other tenets of classical property law are discussed in Monroe's es-
say "Ownership" collected in Making Law Blind, 168 (1987).
137. See Comment, The Public Trust Totem in Public Land Law: Ineffective-And
Undesirable-Judicial Intervention, 10 ECOLOGY L.Q. 455, 469-71 (1982) (arguing that
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vantage of property owners. '
Despite these developments which forebode dramatic changes in
American property law, it is important to note that the conceptual un-
derpinnings of this transformation in the idea of property ownership
are traceable to the early common law and economic development of
our society. In the late eighteenth century, agrarian conceptions of
property entitled owners to undisturbed enjoyment. The early nine-
teenth century brought a movement toward dynamic, instrumental,
more abstract views of property which emphasized newly paramount
ideals of productive use and development.139 Blackstone's Commenta-
ries include the concept of private property in conflict with public de-
mand for property and resources common to all, as well as the notion
of the transience of private property ownership:
Thus also a vine or other tree might be said to be in common, as all
men were equally entitled to its produce; and yet any private individ-
ual might gain the sole property of the fruit, which he had gathered
for his own repast. A doctrine well illustrated by Cicero, who com-
pares the world to a great theatre, which is common to the public, and
yet the place which any man has taken is for a time his own.140
These conceptual origins of property and environmental law re-
flect the protection of "certain things of importance to the entire com-
munity from private exploitation by individual owners.' 4 1 Traditional
ideas of property rights included some state-enforced restrictions and
duties imposed on private property owners."4 Environmental doc-
trines, laws, and regulations which curb the private property owner's
freedoms are reflections of these principles in their modern adaptions.
Thus, courts and legislatures, faced with the twin spectres of environ-
mental contamination and dwindling natural resources, are invoking
these historic concepts in response to contemporary demand. Popula-
tion explosion, industrial growth, and chemical contamination threaten
the right to unencumbered property use. The legal system's challenge
is to develop environmental doctrines that satisfy societal needs and
justify curtailment of the rights of property owners.
14 3
Many policies underlying contemporary environmental law are
utilitarian. They reflect the realization that the planet is finite and
138. Sax, supra note 133, at 481; see Horwitz, The Transformation in the Concep-
tion of Property in American Law, 1780-1860, 40 U. CH. L. Rzv. 248, 249 (1973).
139. See Horwitz, supra note 138, at 249.
140. 2 NV. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *4.
141. See Coquillette, supra note 129, at 821.
142. See Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8, 21 (1927).
143. See Coquillette, supra note 129, at 764.
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contains finite natural resources;' 4 ' yet the planet must support poten-
tially infinite numbers of human beings for a potentially infinite period
of time. Principles of utility look forward to "future effects of acts and
rules on the general welfare." 124 Utilitarianism is especially suited to
environmental law because the allocation and protection of increas-
ingly scarce resources, including clean air and water, must be viewed in
terms of consequences to the aggregate welfare. Commentators envi-
sion a future in which "public (nonexclusive) rather than privatized
(exclusive) benefits are going to loom much larger in long-term re-
source planning. "146
Accordingly, the private landowner, albeit ownership in fee simple,
is becoming somewhat of a custodian of land and other natural re-
sources belonging to future public generations. By law, he is charged
with the prudent, ecologically sound use of his property. 147 Environ-
mental laws impose harsh penalties on owners of contaminated land.
Furthermore, penalties are imposed even though the owner's conduct,
for example, the spillage of chemicals on the soil, in recent times and
under traditional purview would have been regarded as unquestionably
the owner's "right" to do by virtue of his ownership."'
8
From a theoretical standpoint, the resultant trends are indicative
of dramatic and previously unimagined changes in the American con-
ceptions of property ownership and the balance between public and
private rights. These changes are manifest in the expansion of the pub-
lic trust doctrine and other environmental remedies:
144. See Ecclesiastes 1:9 ("[T]here is no new thing under the sun." (emphasis
omitted)).
145. See Owen, The Moral Foundations of Punitive Damages, 40 ALA. L. REv. 705,
713 (1989). The author writes:
Consequential in nature, [the concept of utility] evaluates the ethical content
of acts and rules in terms of their aggregate welfare-the extent to which the
aggregate or average happiness of all citizens is advanced. Standing in contrast
to right-based theories of ethics such as freedom,. . . the principle of utility is
thus teleological, looking forward to the future effects of acts and rules on the
general welfare as the basis for judging their moral content.
Id.
146. See Sax, supra note 133, at 495-96 (1983).
147. See F. GRAD, supra note 1, at 1017 (quoting Berlin, Roseman & Kessler, Law in
Action, in LAw AND THE ENVmONMENr 166 (Baldwin ed. 1970) ("The public interest re-
quires that man's environment be utilized in a manner that permits the maximum num-
ber of people to obtain benefits of their environment.").
148. The traditional right of property included "that sole and despotic dominion
which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclu-
sion of the right of any other individual in the universe." 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTA-
Rms *2; see also Sax, Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine from Its Historical Shackles,
14 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 185, 188 (1980) ("The central idea of the public trust is preventing
the destabilizing disappointment of [common property] expectations . . ").
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[t]he [public trust] doctrine threatens to fuel a developing clash in
liberal ideology between furthering individual rights of security and
dignity, bound up in notions of private property protection, and sup-
porting environmental protection and resource preservation goals, in-
evitably dependent on intrusive governmental programs designed to
achieve longer-term collectivist goals.19
These tensions mirror the larger debate between public and private
control of natural resources. 150
The blurring of traditional boundaries between public and private
property occurs in cases in which the fee simple rights of private title
holders are compromised to accommodate the public trust. Several
courts have held that conveyances to private parties in fee simple may
remain subject to public rights to the property conveyed. 151 Citing
competing demands for scarce resources, courts have imposed public
rights in private property, thus creating hybrid forms of ownership.'
5'
For example, in Boston Waterfront Development Corp. v. Com-
monwealth'5s the issue concerned the fee simple title to land covered
by the seaward end of a wharf constructed over filled land. The wharf
was partly covered by the corner of a granite building renovated into
shops, offices, restaurants, and condominiums. The courts held that the
title was subject to the public trust and implied a condition subsequent
that the land be used for the public purpose for which it was
granted. 1'5 The court noted that the import of its holding was that
"the land in question is not, like ordinary private land held in fee sim-
ple absolute, subject to development at the sole whim of the owner, but
it is impressed with a public trust, which gives the public's representa-
tives an interest and responsibility in its development.'15 5 Recognizing
149. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural Re-
sources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IowA L. REv. 631, 633 (1986); see
Stevens, The Public Trust: A Sovereign's Ancient Prerogative Becomes the People's En-
vironmental Right, 14 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 195, 196 (1980).
150. See Note, supra note 63, at 571.
151. E.g., San Diego County Archaeological Soc'y, Inc. v. Compadres, 81 Cal. App.
3d 923, 146 Cal. Rptr. 786 (1978) (holding that lagoon conveyed was subject to public
trust easement claimed by city and state), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Summa
Corp. v. California, 466 U.S. 198 (1984) (state's claim to such a servitude must have been
presented in the federal patent proceeding in order to survive the issue of a fee patent);
see Boston Elevated R.R. v. Commonwealth, 310 Mass. 528, 39 N.E.2d 87 (1942).
152. See United States v. 1.58 Acres of Land, 523 F. Supp. 120, 123 (D. Mass. 1981)
("Historically, no developed western civilization has recognized absolute rights of private
ownership in [public trust] land as a means of allocating this scarce and precious re-
source among the competing public demands.").
153. 378 Mass. 629, 393 N.E.2d 356 (1979).
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the incongruity of the public trust doctrine applied to a fee simple
grant, the court stated that "this [public trust] concept is difficult to
describe in language in complete harmony with the language of the law
ordinarily applied to privately owned property.'
15 6
The public trust doctrine and the recognition of public rights in
private natural resources also illustrates changing conceptions of sover-
eignty and the role of the sovereign in the allocation of these resources.
The modern trend includes an erosion of traditional concepts of pri-
vate property rights and the substitution of new notions of sovereign
power over these resources.157 Professor Sax views governmental inter-
vention in resource allocation as a necessary response to the misalloca-
tion of land and resources occurring as a result of private ownership
rights.1 8 The trust doctrine provides a mechanism for judicial overview
of state resource management decisions in which the public interest of
the majority is frequently overshadowed by a vocal, politically power-
ful minority consisting of developers, corporations, and others who




The fortification of the public trust doctrine is indicative of the
larger trend of increasing environmental controls and protective legis-
lation. The proscription of some private property rights and a corre-
sponding increase in the public right to unspoiled natural resources is
inevitable. Some commentators and courts regard this trend with un-
easiness and decry the negative portents of the loss of private rights.
However, the environmental problems facing the American society are
of such magnitude as to require correspondingly dramatic and far-
reaching legislative and judicial remedial intervention. When balanced
according to a conventional cost/benefit analysis, the abdication of
some private property rights may be a small price to pay for the rescue
of our imperiled environment.
Johanna Searle
156. Id.; see also Boston Elevated R.R. v. Commonwealth, 310 Mass. 528, 39 N.E.2d
87 (1942) (irrevocable grant of public land to railroad company can nevertheless be re-
voked if company fails to construct railway within the designated time period).
157. See Lazarus, supra note 149, at 633.
158. Sax, supra note 133, at 488. Professor Sax notes that as a result of this trend,
"what was long viewed as exceptional (government intervention to allocate correctly) is
becoming commonplace. This change cannot help but impose enormous pressure upon
our conception of the role that private ownership in land should play." Id.
159. Note, The Public Trust and the Constitution: Routes to Judicial Overview of
Resources Management Decisions in Virginia, 75 VA. L. REv. 895, 916 (1989).
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